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Abstract
We present a model of competition between web search algorithms, and study the impact
of such competition on user welfare. In our model, search providers compete for customers by
strategically selecting which search results to display in response to user queries. Customers, in
turn, have private preferences over search results and will tend to use search engines that are
more likely to display pages satisfying their demands.
Our main question is whether competition between search engines increases the overall wel-
fare of the users (i.e., the likelihood that a user finds a page of interest). When search engines
derive utility only from customers to whom they show relevant results, we show that they dif-
ferentiate their results, and every equilibrium of the resulting game achieves at least half of
the welfare that could be obtained by a social planner. This bound also applies whenever the
likelihood of selecting a given engine is a convex function of the probability that a user’s demand
will be satisfied, which includes natural Markovian models of user behavior.
On the other hand, when search engines derive utility from all customers (independent of
search result relevance) and the customer demand functions are not convex, there are instances
in which the (unique) equilibrium involves no differentiation between engines and a high degree
of randomness in search results. This can degrade social welfare by a factor of Ω(
√
N) relative
to the social optimum, where N is the number of webpages. These bad equilibria persist even
when search engines can extract only small (but non-zero) expected revenue from dissatisfied
users, and much higher revenue from satisfied ones.
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†Microsoft Research, New England
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1 Introduction
One of the most central tenets of economic market theory is that competition between vendors
will benefit consumers, whether by driving down prices, encouraging product differentiation, or
increasing the overall quality of goods. This belief is supported by many models and a long history
of empirical studies. (See, e.g., [15, 21] for classic overviews.)
In a market where consumers directly buy products from vendors, these benefits of competition
are clear: given a choice between multiple competing products, a customer can be expected to
choose whichever he finds most appealing at its given price. This dynamic naturally leaves inferior
and overpriced products unsold.
In this paper, we analyze a game of competition between search engines, and its impact on
the welfare of the users. The main difference between the market for sponsored search and classic
oligopoly models is that in sponsored search, users are not the customers (since search results are
provided to them for free), but the product, which is sold to advertisers. As a result, a search
engine might have an interest in satisfying users only inasmuch as it can monetize their visit and
satisfaction — this results in a potentially serious misalignment of incentives, and thus loss in user
welfare. Of course, this effect may be partially mitigated by the fact that a reputation for quality
can help to attract future usage of a search engine, so competition may help users.
At a high level, a competition between search engines is essentially a competition between (po-
tentially randomized) algorithms that return collections of webpages in response to search queries.
A query typically does not completely determine which web pages are being searched for.1 As a
result, search engines will generally not be able to deterministically satisfy every user; in return,
a searcher may not know whether a set of results will satisfy his demand before choosing a search
provider.2
If there is only a single engine that acts as a monopolist, the algorithmic solution to the web
search problem is clear: given a query, the engine should display the pages that maximize the
probability that the user is satisfied. (We assume that engines have accurate estimates of searchers’
probabilities for desiring different pages.) When multiple engines compete for customers, it is less
clear how the engines will behave at equilibrium. Will they differentiate their search results to
capture different parts of the market, or will competition perversely drive them toward displaying
esoteric webpages in their rankings, degrading the overall user experience?
The main insight of our work is that the answer depends on two features of the competition:
(1) the alignment of utility between the engines and users, and (2) how users respond to search
result quality. In order to elaborate on these insights, we briefly describe some features of our basic
model of competitive search. (The missing parts of the model are defined in Section 2.)
1.1 A brief overview of the model
K search engines are competing for the attention of users, by displaying the set of N web pages
in some order. Each query by a user3 induces a known probability distribution over subsets S
of web pages; the probability associated with the set S is the probability that the user would be
satisfied upon seeing at least one page in S. When the query arrives, each search engine can select
(a distribution over) the order in which the N pages are displayed. In addition to the set S, the
1Think of polysemy, or simply different information needs of different users.
2In this sense, search results are an “experience good” [20].
3whom we can imagine as drawn from an infinite population
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user’s type also includes a patience threshold t: he is satisfied if the first t pages in the ordering
contain at least one page from S.
Based on the distributions of orders in which the K search engines display pages, a user in-
terested in a set S will choose an engine to visit. The choice can be probabilistic, and will be
correlated in some way with search performance. We assume that the probability of choosing en-
gine i is monotone non-decreasing in the probability that i would satisfy the user, and monotone
non-increasing in the probabilities that the competing engines i′ 6= i would satisfy him. This model
of user behavior is very general, allowing for many concrete instantiations of such selection rules,
including natural Markovian models4, proportional choice, and others.
We note that even though a user’s choice depends on the search engines’ algorithms, the intended
interpretation is not that users know their desired webpages in advance (which would eliminate the
need for search engines). Rather, our model is intended to capture the fact that the fraction of
users choosing an engine can depend, possibly in the long run, on the likelihood that a query on a
certain topic will result in satisfactory search results.
It remains to describe the search engine payoffs in the game. When a user visits a search engine,
it derives revenue by showing ads to the user. In sponsored search, the user is shown ads that are
aligned with his perceived intent. Thus, even conditioned on a user having chosen a given engine,
the revenue generated can be correlated with how well the engine inferred the user’s intent, which
is correlated with whether the user was satisfied by the search results. Motivated by this, we define
engine utilities as follows: an engine receives a payoff of 1 for every user that visits the engine and
is satisfied, and a payoff of β ∈ [0, 1] for users that visit the engine but are not satisfied. That is,
when β = 1 an engine receives full benefit from each user regardless of the search results, whereas
β = 0 implies that an engine receives no revenue from a customer if it presents irrelevant results.
There is a natural interpretation of the parameter β in terms of the type of advertising chosen
by the search engines. When using per-impression advertising (e.g., banner ads), the search engine
receives the full payment from the advertiser when a user visits, regardless of satisfaction; this
corresponds to β = 1. On the other hand, with per-click advertising, the search engine is paid only
when a user clicks on an ad, which will be highly correlated with the relevance of the results and
ads displayed; thus, pure per-click advertising corresponds to β = 0. A mix of the two advertising
models naturally gives rise to intermediate values of β.
We emphasize that even in the extreme case of β = 1 (a fully per-impression advertising model),
user satisfaction is still relevant as it provides a way to attract users away from competing engines.
The difference lies in how a user is valued, given that he has already made his choice about which
engine to use.
1.2 Our Results
We find that the outcome of competition depends heavily on both the value of β (i.e., on whether
or not an engine derives direct benefit from unsatisfied users), and on the form of the selection
rule (i.e., how users respond to changes in satisfaction probability). Our main analytical result,
informally stated, is the following dichotomy:
1. If β = 0 (search engines obtain revenue only when a user is satisfied), or if the engine selection
rule is convex, then the equilibrium (which is essentially unique) will have a large amount
4For example, a user might stick with his current engine until it fails to satisfy a query, at which point he switches
to an alternative.
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of specialization. Engines will choose deterministic strategies aimed at targeting particular
subsets of the users. Regardless of the number of search engines, the Price of Anarchy is
bounded by 2, even for mixed or correlated equilibria, and this bound is tight. In other
words, competition degrades user satisfaction at most by a factor 2 compared to the outcome
if engines were to pool their resources to best satisfy users.
2. In contrast, we show in Section 4.1 that if β > 0, then for a large class of non-convex engine
selection rules, there exist symmetric equilibria, i.e., all engines use the same algorithm. In
this equilibrium, there is no specialization, meaning that users are no better off than with a
single engine. In fact, there are cases in which the equilibria can be worse than the optimal
single-engine solution, with a pure Price of Anarchy of Ω(
√
N) even when K = 2. When
β = 1 we show that this equilibrium is unique, and hence even the pure Price of Stability is
Ω(
√
N).
Thus, informally stated, when search engines only want to satisfy viewers (e.g., because they
use purely per-click advertising), searcher welfare is guaranteed to be close to the social optimum,
whereas it can be very far from optimum when search engines only want to attract viewers (e.g.,
because they use purely per-impression advertising). However, these inefficiencies vanish under
certain models of user behavior that result in convex selection rules. The intuition behind this
phenomenon is that convexity incentivizes engines to have high satisfaction probability for a few
user types, rather than infrequently satisfying many types. The overall result is specialization
among the engines if there are enough high-demand pages. As a concrete example, we show that
convexity occurs under a natural class of Markovian models of user behavior.
1.3 Related Work
Our model is closely related to the study of competitive algorithm design due to Immorlica et
al. [8]. In that work, two algorithms (for a general optimization problem) compete to maximize
the probability that they will outperform their opponent on an (unknown, randomly selected)
input. Competitive search is given as an example in [8], though their model differs significantly
from our own: in their version, the goal of each engine is to place a single desired page closer to
the top of the search results than the opponent. The all-or-nothing nature of this goal creates
some unintuitive best-response strategies, and may be questionable in terms of modeling actual
web searcher behavior. In contrast, we focus on a richer model of competition between search
algorithms, and explore the (in)efficiency of equilibria for this class of games. There does not
appear to be a direct reduction from the model of [8] to our general model.
A somewhat similar model of search engine competition was proposed by Khoussainov and
Kushmerick [10, 11]. They consider a metasearcher that directs queries to specialized engines. The
decision space and utility structure of the game are different: Khoussainov and Kushmerick assume
that search engines decide on topics to include into (or exclude from) their indexes, and that there
is a cost associated with including topics. The selection rule used in their model is the Majority
Selection Rule from Section 2.4 of our paper, and a search engine derives full benefit from all users
that are directed to it (in our terminology, the case β = 1). Rather than studying the equilibria
of the resulting game, Khoussainov and Kushmerick [10, 11] propose and experimentally evaluate
reinforcement learning approaches for the search engines.
Differentiation between competing search engines has been studied under economic models
by Mukhodhyay, Telang, and Rajan [17]. They primarily focus on vertical differentiation, i.e.,
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why lower-quality search engines can survive in a market. Mukhodhyay, Telang, and Rajan also
include a model including horizontal differentiation, which means that search engines can choose
different answers to appeal to different users; their models are stylized in that they allow choice of
a quality level and a “location” for the engine; as such, they somewhat resemble Hotelling’s model
for competition [7].
Competition between search engines has also been studied in an economic model by Argenton
and Pru¨fer [3]. Their model focuses on externalities that arise when engines can use data from
past searches to improve future searches, leading to herding behavior toward a monopoly. Their
main recommendation is that in order to encourage competition, engines should be forced to share
search histories with each other. In this sense, their model focuses on an aspect orthogonal to ours.
Competition for user participation has been modeled in the context of auctions [14, 16, 18]. In
these settings, each auctioneer selects a mechanism; bidders then select an auction to participate in
and decide on their bidding strategy. The nature of payoffs to the players is significantly different
between auctioneers and search engines; among others, the participants (bidders) compete with
each other after choosing an auction, and are fully rationally in their choices, whereas we do not
assume rationality of the searchers, and searchers naturally do not compete with each other.
The revenue of a single search engine has been studied under various models of user behavior
and advertising revenue [1, 4, 6, 9]. These works focus on the game played by advertisers, rather
than by multiple search engines.
The analysis of product differentiation in competitive markets has a long history in economic
theory. The classic Hotelling model [7] implies that competing firms will tend to produce similar
products. Later works, beginning with Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse [5], instead find that
product differentiation can improve revenue by, for example, thinning markets to affect future
prices. See [21] for a treatment of this classic theory. In contrast, differentiation occurs in our
model as a way for competitors to reduce customer uncertainty about the product they will receive
from each. Correspondingly, this differentiation occurs at equilibrium when the incentives of the
search engines are strongly aligned with the customers’ ultimate product satisfaction.
Our analysis of competition in the case β = 0 shares some similarities with the analysis of valid
utility games [22] and smooth games [19]. We note that the click-through variant of our game is
mathematically similar to Oren and Kleinberg’s recent analysis of a research credit allocation game
[12], where researchers select projects in which to invest effort. Besides the motivation behind these
games, the primary difference is that we model a search engine’s (pure) strategy as a probability
distribution over search results, rather than a deterministic list of pages.
2 Models and Concepts
We employ the following (standard) notation. We write [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Vectors are denoted by
bold face. For a vector x, we use x−i to denote the vector without coordinate i, and (y,x−i) for
the vector with coordinate i replaced by y. We denote the indicator function by 1; that is, for an
event E , we write 1[E ] for the function that is 1 when E happens and 0 otherwise.
We will frequently reason about distributions over discrete sets (or their power sets). Let A
be a finite set, and p a distribution over A. We say that p is in general position if for every pair
S, S′ ⊆ A of distinct sets (S 6= S′), we have that p(S) 6= p(S′). Notice that the set of distributions
not in general position has measure 0, i.e., distributions are generically in general position.
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2.1 The Search Engine Competition Game
Our formal model of competition between search engines is as follows. The game is played by K
engines. There is a universe Ω of N possible webpages, and an infinite population of users (or
searchers).5 Users wish to find webpages, and search engines are interested in attracting users, and
possibly also in satisfying their search needs.
Each user has a private type specified by a subset S ⊆ Ω of pages and a slot threshold t ≥ 0. S
is the set of pages that would satisfy the user’s request, and we call it the desired pages or satisfying
pages of the user. t is the number of search results the user will examine to find a satisfying page
before abandoning the search; we also call t the patience threshold (or simply threshold) of the user.
There is a commonly known distribution Γ over user types, where γ(S, t) is the probability of
drawing the pair (S, t). This distribution incorporates the search query issued by the user; in other
words, we consider the game for a specific query, since games for different queries can be solved
independently.6 Without loss of generality, we assume that
∑
S∋n
∑
t γ(S, t) > 0 for all pages
n ∈ Ω, i.e., each page satisfies at least one type in the support of Γ.
The search engines have knowledge of Γ. Their strategies are based on permutations of pages
j ∈ Ω. When engine i plays permutation σi, she places page σi(j) in slot j (for each j). We also
think of σi as a matching between slots and pages, and write σi[t] = {σi(j) | j ∈ [t]} for the set
of pages placed in the first t slots by engine i. A user with type (S, t) is satisfied by a matching
σi precisely if σi[t] ∩ S 6= ∅, i.e., if at least one of the pages satisfying the user is among the top t
pages displayed by the engine.
When a user visits engine i, the engine obtains utility 1 if the user is satisfied, and utility
β ∈ [0, 1], a fixed parameter of the game, if the user is not satisfied. The parameter β models the
tradeoff between optimizing for market share vs. customer satisfaction, or the fraction of display
ads among the ads shown by the engine. A large value of β means that the engine would simply
like to attract many users, while a small value implies that users are primarily (or only) valuable
if they are satisfied.
A pure strategy for engine i is a distribution Di over matchings. (This apparent misnomer is
discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.) A (pure) strategy profile D = (D1, . . . ,DK) is a vector
of strategies, one for each engine. A user type (S, t) and engine strategy Di together determine a
satisfaction probability qi(S, t,Di) = Probσ∼Di [σ[t]∩S 6= ∅]. We often write qi for qi(S, t,Di) when
the type and strategy are clear from the context. The vector of the satisfaction probabilities for all
engines is denoted by q(S, t,Di) or q. Engines may also mix strategies, playing distributions over
distributions. In particular, below, we will be interested in correlated equilibria of the game.
Two permutations σ, σ′ are equivalent with respect to Γ if, for every type (S, t) in the support
of Γ, (S, t) is satisfied by either both or neither of the permutations. For example, if every user has
a threshold of at least 2, then two permutations that differ only in the order of the first two pages
are equivalent. A pure strategy is deterministic if its support consists entirely of permutations
that are equivalent to each other; we abuse terminology by stating that such a strategy consists
of a single permutation. A strategy profile (pure or mixed) is deterministic if the support of each
engine’s distribution contains only deterministic strategies.
A user of type (S, t) must select which search engine to use, taking into account the profile q
of satisfaction probabilities. A selection rule is a function f which maps a profile of satisfaction
5We consistently use female pronouns for search engines and male pronouns for searchers.
6This holds under the (strong) assumption that users choose their engine per query. See a brief discussion of this
issue in Section 7.
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probabilities q to a distribution over search engines. We write fi(q) for the probability that a user
selects engine i given q. We discuss properties of selection rules and several concrete examples in
more detail in Section 2.4 below.
The precise sequence of events in the game is as follows. First, the engines jointly determine a
mixed strategy profile C. Let ρ(D) be the density function of the joint distribution of pure strategies
under C. Notice that we allow the random choices to be correlated. Once C is determined, a vector
of pure (but not necessarily deterministic) strategies D is drawn according to ρ. Next, a user type
(S, t) is realized from Γ. D is known to the user, and determines a satisfaction probability profile
q = (q1, . . . , qK) for the engines. The user selects a search engine stochastically according to the
distribution f(q). After the user selects an engine, say i, a permutation σi is realized from the
distribution Di. If the user is satisfied by σi, engine i receives a payoff of 1; otherwise, she receives
a payoff of β. All other engines i′ 6= i receive payoff 0. In summary, the payoff to engine i under
the joint strategy profile C is
ui(C) =
∫
D
∑
S⊆Ω
t≥0
γ(S, t) · fi(q(S, t,D)) · (β + (1− β)qi(S, t,Di)) · ρ(D)dD. (1)
We call this game the Search Engine Competition Game with parameters β and Γ, and denote
it by Searchβ(Γ).
2.2 Strategies, Equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy
We now discuss in more depth the choice to consider distributions Di as pure strategies. The reason
that we cannot simply consider engines as mixing over pure strategies which are permutations is
that the engines’ payoffs are defined in terms of user behavior, and users’ behaviors depend on the
entire probability distributions chosen by the engines.
In other words, it is necessary to know the distributions over pure strategies in order to even
define the game’s payoffs. Thus, the pure strategies have to be the engines’ distributions Di. For
the same reason, when engines are playing mixed strategies, it is necessary to assume that the
searchers are aware of the pure strategies drawn by the engines; this would be realistic if the
changes in engines’ strategies occurred at a much slower time scale than the users’ adaptation.
We will carefully distinguish nomenclature between pure strategies and deterministic strategies,
which — as defined above — are ones that have probability 1 of selecting a particular permutation
(or its equivalence class). With this understanding in hand, a (pure) Nash Equilibrium of the game
is a strategy profile D in pure strategies from which no single engine can unilaterally deviate to
strictly improve her utility. Pure Nash Equilibria may not exist (even for β = 0) — we show a
simple example of this in Appendix A — so we broaden the space of allowed strategy profiles.
Definition 1 (Correlated Equilibrium) Fix a finite probability space (Ω, δ). For each i =
1, . . . ,K, let Zi : Ω → Zi be a signal (random variable), using the same domain, and write
Z = (Z1, . . . , ZK).
The strategy of player i is a mapping µi from Zi to the pure strategies of player i. (µ1, µ2, . . . , µK)
is a correlated equilibrium iff for each player i and each mapping µ′i from Zi to the pure strategies
of player i, we have that
EZ∼δ [ui((µ1(Z1), . . . , µi(Zi), . . . , µK(ZK)))] ≥ EZ∼δ
[
ui((µ1(Z1), . . . , µ
′
i(Zi), . . . , µK(ZK)))
]
. (2)
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In other words, given the signal he received, each player prefers playing according to the suggested
strategy over any other strategy.
We denote the set of all Correlated Equilibria by EQCorrβ (Γ). As usual, we omit the parameters
when they are clear from the context, in which case we simply write EQCorr.
We measure the quality of a strategy profile by the welfare of the searchers, i.e., the probability
that a user drawn from Γ is satisfied by his chosen engine. The welfare is
W (C) =
∫
D
∑
S⊆Ω
t≥0
γ(S, t) ·
∑
i
fi(q(S, t,D)) · qi(S, t,Di) · ρ(D)dD. (3)
It is well known that equilibria can sometimes be very inefficient in terms of the welfare they
yield. Let OPT denote a strategy profile for the engines that maximizes the searcher welfare. The
degradation of welfare at equilibrium, compared to this optimum profile, is typically measured by
two quantities: the (pure, mixed, or correlated) Price of Anarchy (PoA) [13, 19] supD∈EQCorr
W (OPT)
W (D)
captures the worst-case welfare loss resulting from selfish rational behavior by the engines; the Price
of Stability (PoS) [2] infD∈N
W (OPT)
W (D) captures the welfare loss incurred by insisting that a strategy
profile must be stable against selfish unilateral deviations. (Here, the infimum is usually taken over
Nash Equilibria N , as correlated equilibria are more permissive, and would thus lower the value.)
For our upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy, we will prove bounds on the Correlated Price
of Anarchy, while all our lower bounds will be achieved by pure Nash Equilibria.
2.3 The Singleton Search Engine Game
All of the lower bounds on PoA (or PoS) which we prove in this paper arise already in a very
restricted form of the Search Engine Competition Game, which we call the Singleton Search Engine
Game. In the Singleton Search Engine Game, each user always has a patience threshold of 1, and
desires a singleton set. Thus, the distribution Γ can be specified simply as γ(n) := γ(1, {n}).
Furthermore, since no user ever looks past the first slot, engine strategies are equivalent iff they
agree in the page in the first slot. In particular, for the purpose of the game, a distribution D is
completely specified by the probability distribution of pages in slot 1. We will therefore frequently
speak simply of an engine “displaying” or “choosing” a page, without specifying a slot (which is
understood to be slot 1).
This distribution is characterized by the probability of satisfying any given type of user (which
can now be identified with the desired page n). Therefore, for instances of the Singleton Search
Engine Game, an engine i’s pure strategy can be fully specified by the probability vector qi =
(qi(n))
N
n=1 of probabilities of displaying pages n = 1, . . . , N . In this representation, the utility of
engine i under a pure strategy profile is
∑
n∈Ω γ(n)fi(qi(n)) · (β + (1− β)qi(n)).
2.4 User Behavior and Selection Rules
We model the users as stochastic entities, choosing engines via a probabilistic process that depends
on their probability of being satisfied. A selection rule f captures a model of user behavior. We
assume the same selection rule is used by each user,7 and that the effect of the engines’ strategies
7We note that the space of selection rules is convex, so the selection rule in which each user independently
randomizes between using a rule f1 or an alternative rule f2 is, itself, a selection rule.
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on user behavior can be captured entirely by the satisfaction probability profile q. We assume
that each fi is monotone non-decreasing in qi and non-increasing in qi′ for each i
′ 6= i. That is,
an engine’s probability of being chosen by a user of type (S, t) is non-decreasing in the probability
that this user will be satisfied, and non-increasing in the probability that other engines will satisfy
him. We do not assume that fi is differentiable or continuous.
This model is very general, encompassing almost all rational selection rules one could imagine.
We illustrate it with several examples, capturing different models of behavior.
Proportional Selection Proportional selection is defined by fi(q) =
qi∑
j qj
, with fi(0) := 1/K.
In this rule, a user picks engine i with probability proportional to the probability that he will
be satisfied by engine i. Similar rules have frequently been used in past models that involved
a user selecting a vendor according to the quality of the vendors’ products.
Markovian selection The Markovian selection rule has fi(q) =
bi∑
j bj
, where bj =
1
1−qj for each
engine j. If any qj is equal to 1, then fi(q) = 1/k if qi = 1, where k is the number of engines
with qj = 1, and fi(q) = 0 if qi < 1. This selection rule captures the stationary distribution
of a process in which a user repeatedly uses a given engine until she does not satisfy him,
then switches to another engine uniformly at random. (A more general version is defined in
Section 6.)
Majority selection rule The Majority selection rule is defined as follows: Let A = argmaxi qi be
the set of engines maximizing the satisfaction probability of a given user. Then the Majority
selection rule sets fi(q) = 1/|A| for all i ∈ A, and fi(q) = 0 for all i /∈ A. The Majority
selection rule captures the behavior of a user who chooses an engine that maximizes his
probability of being satisfied, breaking ties uniformly at random.
3 Convexity, Determinism, and High Welfare
In this section, we examine the role of convexity in the search engines’ utility functions. Roughly
speaking, we show that when the selection rule f is convex, each engine’s utility is strictly convex.
This convexity, or alternatively, the assumption that β = 0, implies that every correlated equilib-
rium is deterministic; in other words, engines do not mix over distributions of permutations, but
only over permutations. For pure equilibria, this implies that engines simply play one permuta-
tion (or an equivalence class of permutations) deterministically. In turn, we will show that the
restriction to deterministic strategies implies a bound of 2 on the correlated PoA.
In Section 6, we will show that, for a natural and general class of Markovian user behaviors,
the selection rule f is indeed convex; hence, for arbitrary β, this type of user behavior yields a
correlated PoA of at most 2.
We begin by defining a non-indifference property of selection rules. Roughly speaking, we wish
to exclude selection rules for which a search engine’s probability of satisfying a user has effectively
no impact on that user’s selection. We define the support S(q) of a satisfaction probability vector
q to be the set of engines i for which qi > 0. We say that f is non-indifferent if the following
two properties hold. First, whenever |S(q)| ≥ 2 and qj < 1 for some j ∈ S(q), there exists some
i ∈ S(q) such that fi(q) < fi(1,q−1). That is, if at least two engines would satisfy a user with
positive probability, and not all supporting engines satisfy the user with probability 1, then at
least one supporting engine would be more likely to attract the user by sufficiently increasing her
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probability of satisfying him. Second, if there exists some i such that qi = 1, then fj(q) = 0 for all
j 6∈ S(q). That is, if some engine is guaranteed to satisfy the user, then the user will not choose
an engine that is guaranteed not to satisfy him. The non-indifference property is quite weak; in
particular, it is significantly weaker than assuming that fi is strictly increasing in qi. For example,
both the Majority and Markovian selection rules described at the end of Section 2 are not strictly
increasing in the satisfaction probabilities, but do satisfy non-indifference.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that Γ is in general position, and at least one of the following three holds
for each i:
1. β < 1, and fi(qi,q−1) is a convex function of qi;
2. β = 1, and fi(qi,q−1) is strictly convex in qi;
3. β = 0 and fi is non-indifferent.
Then, each correlated equilibrium of the game Searchβ(Γ) is deterministic.
Proof. The high-level idea of the proof is the following: if selection rules are convex or β = 0, an
engine can increase her utility by choosing two outcomes she randomizes between, deciding which
one contributes more to the overall utility, and increasing the probability of returning that outcome
at the expense of the other. The exact calculations are somewhat cumbersome.
Fix a correlated equilibrium C, and assume for contradiction that the support of C is not
entirely deterministic. Fix an engine i and a signal Zi given to i with positive probability, such
that conditioned on receiving Zi, engine i plays a non-deterministic strategy Di. From engine i’s
viewpoint, conditioned on Zi, the other engines i
′ 6= i are playing mixed strategies, randomizing in
possibly correlated ways over possibly non-deterministic strategies. Let ρ−i(D−i) denote the joint
density over the strategies played by engines i′ 6= i, conditioned on Zi.
Let Supp(Γ) denote the support of Γ, and consider a type (S, t) ∈ Supp(Γ). When engine i
satsifies users of type (S, t) with probability x, its expected utility conditioned on the user type
being (S, t) is
gi(x;S, t) =
∫
D−i
fi((x,q−i(S, t,D−i))) · (β + (1− β) · x) · ρ−i(D−i)dD−i.
If fi((x,q−i(S, t,D−i))) is a convex function of x and β < 1, or if fi is strictly convex in x, then
for each (S, t), fi((x,q−i(S, t,D−i))) · (β + (1− β) · x) is a strictly convex function of x, and hence
so is gi(x;S, t). Therefore, under either of the first two assumptions of the theorem, gi(·;S, t) is
strictly convex. (The analysis in the third case β = 0 will proceed similarly, but not explicitly be
based on strict convexity.)
The utility of engine i from playing at this equilibrium is
ui(D) =
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · gi(qi(S, t,Di);S, t).
Engine i plays the non-deterministic strategy Di. For each permutation σ, let Di(σ) be the
probability that engine i chooses the permutation σ. Recall from Section 2.1 that
qi(S, t,Di) =
∑
σ
Di(σ) · 1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅]; (4)
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thus, qi(S, t,Di) is a convex combination of the 1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] terms. In the first two cases of the
theorem, we can use the convexity of gi to obtain that
gi(qi(S, t,Di);S, t) ≤
∑
σ
Di(σ) · gi(1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅];S, t). (5)
In the third case (β = 0, no assumptions on f), Inequality (5) holds for a slightly different reason:
we can write
gi(qi(S, t,Di);S, t) =
∫
D−i
fi((qi(S, t,Di),q−i(S, t,D−i))) · qi(S, t,Di) · ρ−i(D−i)dD−i
≤
∫
D−i
fi((1,q−i(S, t,D−i))) ·
∑
σ
Di(σ) · 1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · ρ−i(D−i)dD−i
=
∑
σ
Di(σ) ·
∫
D−i
fi((1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅],q−i(S, t,D−i))) · 1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · ρ−i(D−i)dD−i
=
∑
σ
Di(σ) · gi(1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅];S, t).
For the inequality, we used monotonicity of the selection rule. In the penultimate step, we used that
whenever 1[σ[t]∩S 6= ∅] 6= 1, then 1[σ[t]∩ S 6= ∅] = 0, so the whole expression for the particular σ
is 0 anyway.
Next, we argue that Inequality (5) is in fact strict for at least one pair (S, t) with γ(S, t) > 0, in
all cases. Because Di is not a deterministic strategy, there exist two non-equivalent permutations
σ, σ′ with Di(σ) ∈ (0, 1) and Di(σ′) ∈ (0, 1). Let X ⊆ Supp(Γ) be the set of types satisfied by σ but
not by σ′, and X ′ ⊆ Supp(Γ) the set of types satisfied by σ′ but not by σ; note that X ∪X ′ 6= ∅ by
non-equivalence. We then have 0 < qi(S, t,Di) < 1 for all (S, t) ∈ X∪X ′. Therefore, in Equation (4)
for those types (S, t), there are both terms with 1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] = 0 and with 1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] = 1.
Thus, for the first two cases (when gi(·;S, t) is strictly convex), Inequality (5) is strict for this (S, t)
pair.8
Again, the reason for the strictness is slightly different in the third case. Focus on the searcher
types (S, t) ∈ X∪X ′. Assume for contradiction that qj(S, t,Dj) = 0 for all j 6= i and (S, t) ∈ X∪X ′,
and that Inequality (5) is not strict. Thus, for each (S, t), (S′, t′) ∈ X ∪X ′,
fi(q(S, t,D)) = fi(1,0) = fi(q(S′, t′,D)).
Because Γ is in general position, we know
∑
(S,t)∈X γ(S, t) 6=
∑
(S,t)∈X′ γ(S, t); w.l.o.g., assume
that the left-hand side is larger. Then, if engine i were to increase the probability of the permutation
σ by some ǫ > 0 while reducing the probability of σ′ by ǫ, her resulting change in utility would be
ǫ ·
( ∑
(S,t)∈X
γ(S, t)fi(q(S, t,D)) −
∑
(S,t)∈X′
γ(S, t)fi(q(S, t,D))
)
= ǫ · fi(1,0) ·
( ∑
(S,t)∈X
γ(S, t)−
∑
(S,t)∈X′
γ(S, t)
)
> 0.
Engine i could thus increase her utility by shifting probability from σ′ to σ, contradicting the
equilibrium assumption. We conclude that there must be another engine j with qj(S, t,Dj) > 0.
8It would not have been strict if all indicator terms had been equal.
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Now, the non-indifference of the selection rules implies that for at least one such engine j (possibly
j = i), fj(q) < fj(1,q−j); for this particular engine j, this implies strictness of Inequality (5). The
remainder of the proof now proceeds with this engine (formerly j) as engine i.
Finally, summing up the strict Inequality (5) over all types (S, t) ∈ Supp(Γ) and changing orders
of summation, we obtain that
ui(D) <
∑
σ
Di(σ) ·
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
gi(1[σ[t] ∩ S 6= ∅];S, t). (6)
The right-hand side of Inequality (6) is exactly the utility of engine i when mixing over de-
terministic strategies instead of playing a non-deterministic strategy. Thus, Di cannot have been
engine i’s best strategy at the correlated equilibrium under signal Zi, a contradiction.
3.1 An Upper Bound on the Correlated Price of Anarchy
We now show that if engines apply deterministic strategies at equilibrium, the resulting outcomes
will generate high social welfare. Combining this result with Theorem 3.1, we conclude that the
PoA of Searchβ(Γ) is at most 2 under the conditions of Theorem 3.1. In fact, we prove a slightly
better bound of 2K−1−βK−β on the PoA, and show that this bound is tight for all β ∈ [0, 1] and K ≥ 2.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that f is non-indifferent and every correlated equilibrium of Searchβ(Γ)
is deterministic. Then, the correlated PoA of Searchβ(Γ) is at most
2K−1−β
K−β .
Proof. Consider a correlated deterministic equilibrium of Searchβ(Γ), characterized by a joint
distribution ρ(σ) over vectors of permutations σ. Let σˆ be the vector of permutations for each
engine under the socially optimal profile. Focus on one engine i and one signal Zi she receives.
Let σi be the permutation played by i when seeing Zi. From the perspective of i, conditioned
on receiving Zi, the other engines are playing a correlated distribution ρ−i(σ−i) over deterministic
strategies.
Let µZiS,t = Prob[∀i′ : σi′ [t]∩S = ∅ | Zi] be the probability that no engine i′ (including i) satisfies
the searcher type (S, t), given that i received the signal Zi. Consider a deviation by i to any σˆj .
This will certainly attract any searcher who would not be satisfied by any other engine, but would
be satisfied by σˆj. Also, any other searcher satisfied by σˆj would select engine i with probability
at least fi(1), by the assumed monotonicity of the selection rule. Finally, this deviation will not
affect the behavior of searchers that are not satisfied by any engine or σˆj . Putting this together,
the expected conditional utility of this deviation is at least
µj =
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · 1[σˆj [t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · µZiS,t
+
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · fi(1) · 1[σˆj[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · (1− µZiS,t)
+ β ·
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · fi(0) · 1[σˆj[t] ∩ S = ∅] · µZiS,t.
Since engine i, receiving the signal Zi, does not want to deviate to σˆj at the correlated equilib-
rium, we have
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µj ≤
∫
σ−i
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · fi(q(S, t, σ)) · qi(S, t, σ) · ρ−i(σ−i)dσ−i + β ·
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · fi(0) · µZiS,t.
The first term is the utility that i obtains from searchers she attracts and satisfies, while the second
term is the utility obtained from searchers that are not satisfied by any engine, and visit engine i
(failing to be satisfied). Taking an expectation over signals Zi, writing µS,t = EZi∼ρi
[
µZiS,t
]
, and
rearranging the terms with β factors, we conclude
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · 1[σˆj[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · µS,t +
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · fi(1) · 1[σˆj[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · (1− µS,t)
≤
∫
σ
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · fi(q(S, t, σ)) · qi(S, t, σ) · ρ(σ)dσ
+ β ·
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · fi(0) · 1[σˆj[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · µS,t.
Taking a sum over all i, and applying the definition of equilibrium welfare W (ρ), we get
K ·
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · 1[σˆj[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · µS,t +
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · 1[σˆj [t] ∩ S 6= ∅] · (1− µS,t) ·
∑
i
fi(1)
≤W (ρ) + β ·
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · µS,t · 1[σˆj[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] ·
∑
i
fi(0).
Using
∑
i fi(0) ≤ 1,
∑
i fi(1) = 1, and summing over all j,
K ·W (ρ) ≥ (K − β) ·
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t)µS,t
∑
j
1[σˆj[t] ∩ S 6= ∅]
+
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t)(1 − µS,t)
∑
j
1[σˆj [t] ∩ S 6= ∅]
≥ (K − β) ·
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t)µS,t · 1[∃j : σˆj [t] ∩ S 6= ∅]
+
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t)(1 − µS,t) · 1[∃j : σˆj [t] ∩ S 6= ∅]
= (K − β) (W (OPT)− λ ·W (ρ)) + λ ·W (ρ)
for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. The last equality follows because
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t) · 1[∃j : σˆj[t] ∩ S 6= ∅] =W (OPT) and
∑
S⊆Ω
∑
t≥0
γ(S, t)(1 − µS,t) ≤W (ρ).
Rearranging, we have W (ρ) ≥ K−β(1+λ)K−λ(β+1) ·W (OPT), with λ ∈ [0, 1]. As K ≥ 2 and β ∈ [0, 1],
this expression is minimized at λ = 1; hence, W (ρ) ≥ K−β2K−β−1W (OPT), as claimed.
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We now show that the PoA bound from Theorem 3.2 is tight for all K ≥ 2 and β ∈ [0, 1], even
for the pure PoA of the Singleton Search Engine Game with a convex selection rule.
Proposition 3.3 Consider the Singleton Search Engine Game with any β ∈ [0, 1] and any sym-
metric, strictly convex selection rule. There are instances in which the PoA is at least 2K−1−βK−β .
Proof. In the tight instance, there are K pages, and γ(1) = K−β2K−1−β , while γ(n) =
1
2K−1−β for
all n > 1. Consider the profile in which each engine displays page 1. For any symmetric selection
rule (convex or otherwise), each engine has utility
γ(1)
K
+ β ·
∑
n>1
γ(n)
K
=
β(K − 2) +K
K(2K − β − 1) .
Since the selection rule is strictly convex, the proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that the utility-maximizing
strategy of each engine is a deterministic strategy. Since the selection rule is symmetric and non-
indifferent, the utility of switching to another page n′ > 1 is equal to
γ(n′) + β ·
∑
n>1
n 6=n′
γ(n)
K
=
β(K − 2) +K
K(2K − β − 1) .
Hence, the strategy profile is an equilibrium. (In fact, by increasing γ(1) by a very small amount,
we can ensure that this strategy is the unique equilibrium.) It satisfies a K−β2K−1−β fraction of users.
On the other hand, the profile in which engine i displays page i satisfies all users. The PoA in this
example is therefore K−β2K−1−β .
4 Symmetric Equilibria and Low Welfare
Next, we analyze equilibria of the Search Engine Competition Game when the conditions of Theo-
rem 3.1 do not apply; that is, when β > 0 and the selection rule is not convex. We will show that
the resulting misalignment of incentives can lead to equilibria with very poor social welfare, i.e.,
high PoA. All of our results are proved already for the Singleton Search Engine Game9.
4.1 When Satisfaction is Irrelevant: β = 1
We begin by considering the case β = 1. Our first result is that when the selection rule f is
symmetric and satisfies a cross-concavity assumption, every pure Nash Equilibrium of the Singleton
Search Engine Game is symmetric. In other words, search engines do not specialize: all engines
apply the same strategy. A user can thus do no better than selecting an engine arbitrarily, and
hence competition does not positively impact social welfare.
9The strong lower bounds continue to hold under the (realistic) assumption that t≪ N . When t ≈ N , searchers
will typically see most pages, so good welfare is obtained.
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4.2 Symmetric Equilibria
We show that, under certain cross-concavity conditions on the selection rule f , all pure Nash
Equilibria of the Singleton Search Engine Game are symmetric. We say that f is symmetric if the
value of fi(q) is invariant under relabeling of the engines, and write f(q) = f1(q) for symmetric
selection rules, as this fully specifies user behavior. f is strictly cross-concave if it satisfies the
following property: for all x and y such that x < y, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all 0 < ǫ < δ,
f(x+ ǫ, y,q−{1,2})− f(x, y,q−{1,2}) > f(y, x,q−{1,2})− f(y − ǫ, x,q−{1,2}).
Intuitively, if f is cross-concave, the increase in user visits that a (trailing) engine experiences when
increasing her satisfaction probability is at least as large as the loss in visits incurred by a (leading)
engine from decreasing her satisfaction probability by the same amount. That is, catching up in
user visits is easier than expanding a lead.
Theorem 4.1 Let Q be a pure strategy equilibrium of the Singleton Search Engine Game with
β = 1 and symmetric and strictly cross-concave selection function f . Then Q must be symmetric.
Proof. The proof proceeds by directly arguing that if two engines employ different strategies,
then cross-concavity implies that one of them can strictly improve her welfare by shifting her page
distribution slightly toward the strategy used by the other.
Let Q = (qi)
K
i=1 be a pure strategy equilibrium of the Singleton Search Engine Game. Assume
for contradiction that Q is not symmetric. Then, there are two engines (without loss of generality,
engines 1 and 2) and two pages (without loss of generality, pages 1 and 2) such that q1(2) < q2(2)
and q1(1) > q2(1). Let δ1 be the constant in the definition of cross-concavity when applied to
engines 1, 2 with x = q1(2) and y = q2(2). Similarly, let δ2 be the constant when the definition is
applied to engines 1, 2 with x = q2(1) and y = q1(1). Fix an arbitrary ǫ < min(δ1, δ2). By strict
cross-concavity,
f(q1(2) + ǫ, q2(2),q−{1,2})− f(q1(2), q2(2),q−{1,2})
> f(q2(2), q1(2),q−{1,2})− f(q2(2)− ǫ, q1(2),q−{1,2}),
f(q2(1) + ǫ, q1(1),q−{1,2})− f(q2(1), q1(1),q−{1,2})
> f(q1(1), q2(1),q−{1,2})− f(q1(1)− ǫ, q2(1),q−{1,2}).
(7)
Because Q is an equilibrium, engine 1 cannot profit from moving ǫ probability from page 1 to
page 2, nor can engine 2 profit from moving ǫ from page 2 to page 1. Thus,
f(q1(2) + ǫ, q2(2),q−{1,2}) + f(q1(1) − ǫ, q2(1),q−{1,2})
≤ f(q1(2), q2(2),q−{1,2}) + f(q1(1), q2(1),q−{1,2}),
f(q2(1) + ǫ, q1(1),q−{1,2}) + f(q2(2) − ǫ, q1(2),q−{1,2})
≤ f(q2(1), q1(1),q−{1,2}) + f(q2(2), q1(2),q−{1,2}).
(8)
Adding the two Equations (7) and subtracting the two Equations (8), all terms cancel and we
are left with the contradiction 0 > 0. Hence, Q must be symmetric.
Theorem 4.1 implies that for symmetric and strictly cross-concave selection rules and β = 1,
more engines do not provide any advantage in pure strategy equilibria. As we show below, this
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implies a PoA of Ω(K). However, we will show that the effects of competition can be even more
negative, by giving lower bounds on the Price of Stability for the proportional selection rule.
Thereto, we next characterize the (unique) equilibrium for the proportional selection rule. The
proof follows from an analysis of the equilibrium condition that no engine wishes to shift probability
mass from any page to any other.
Theorem 4.2 When β = 1 and f is the proportional sharing rule, the Singleton Search Engine
Game has a unique pure Nash Equilibrium; in this equilibrium, each engine selects page n ∈ Ω with
probability γ(n).
Proof. The proportional sharing rule satisfies symmetry and strict cross-concavity. Thus, The-
orem 4.1 guarantees that all pure equilibria are symmetric. It remains to show that a symmetric
equilibrium exists and is unique.
We begin by showing uniqueness and deriving a specific form for the equilibrium. Let Q be
a symmetric pure equilibrium; it is completely described by the (common) probability q(n) with
which the engines choose page n. We claim that q(n) > 0 for all pages n. Assume for contradiction
that q(n) = 0 for some page n, and let n′ be any page with q(n′) > 0. Consider the deviation
in which engine 1 adds a small amount ǫ of probability to page n, and removes it from page n′.
Engine 1 receives all visits from users of type n, for an added payoff of γ(n) > 0 (since each page
is desired with positive probability). The loss in payoff from page n′ is less than γ(n′) · ǫKq(n′) For
small enough ǫ, this is strictly less than the gain γ(n). Thus, Q was not an equilibrium.
Because q(n) > 0 for all n, the strategy profiles under consideration are bounded away in all
coordinates from 0 (and also 1), and thus from the discontinuities (and non-differentiabilities) of
the selection function. We can therefore safely take derivatives.
Engine i is choosing her strategy to maximize
∑
n γ(n)f(q(n)) subject to
∑
n qi(n) = 1; thus,
the derivative of the Lagrangian L(qi, λ) =
∑
n γ(n)f(q(n))) + λ(1−
∑
n qi(n)) with respect to all
variables must be 0:
γ(n)
d
dqi(n)
f(qi(n),q−i(n)) = λ
for each page n. Using the definition of the proportional selection rule, this implies∑
i′ 6=i qi′(n)
(
∑
i′ qi′(n))
2
=
λ
γ(n)
(9)
for each n. As the equilibrium is symmetric, qi′(n) = qi(n) for all i
′, simplifying Equation (9) to
qi(n) =
γ(n)·(K−1)
λK2
. Since qi and Γ are distributions, we must have λK
2/(K − 1) = 1, and hence
qi(n) = γ(n) for all engines i is the only equilibrium.
It remains to prove that this distribution is in fact an equilibrium. Consider any best response
qi by engine i to the symmetric equilibrium qi′(n) = γ(n) played by the other engines. We use
variants of the Lagrangian condition (9), substituting that qi′(n) = γ(n). Assume that qi 6= qi′ ;
thus, there must exist pages n, n′ with 0 ≤ qi(n) < qi′(n) and qi′(n′) < qi(n′) ≤ 1. Since it is
possible that qi(n) = 0 or qi(n
′) = 1, we only obtain weaker Lagrangian conditions of non-positive
(resp., non-negative) derivative, as opposed to derivatives of 0. These weaker Lagrangian conditions
for n, n′ yield
(K − 1)γ(n)
(qi(n) + (K − 1)γ(n))2 ≤
λ
γ(n)
,
(K − 1)γ(n′)
(qi(n′) + (K − 1)γ(n′))2 ≥
λ
γ(n′)
.
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We can rearrange for λ and use that qi(n) < γ(n) and γ(n
′) < qi(n′) to obtain that
(K − 1)γ(n)2
(Kγ(n))2
<
(K − 1)γ(n)2
(qi(n) + (K − 1)γ(n))2 ≤ λ ≤
(K − 1)γ(n′)2
(qi(n) + (K − 1)γ(n′))2 <
(K − 1)γ(n′)2
(Kγ(n′))2
,
a clear contradiction after canceling out the γ(n) terms on the left and the γ(n′) terms on the right.
Thus, the only locally optimal response for player i is to play the same distribution as the other
players, so the symmetric distribution is an equilibrium.
In summary, when users apply the proportional selection rule, it is a (unique) symmetric equi-
librium for each engine to choose its page to display according to the type distribution of the
users.
4.3 Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability
We use Theorem 4.2 to bound the PoS for the Singleton Search Engine Game (and thus also the
Search Engine Competition Game).
Proposition 4.3 Consider the Singleton Search Engine Game with β = 1 and the proportional
selection rule.
1. There are instances in which the PoS is at least K.
2. There are instances with only two engines in which the PoS is Ω(
√
N).
Proof. Suppose that we have N ≥ K pages, and assume w.l.o.g. that γ(1) > γ(2) > · · · >
γ(N), and the probabilities are in general position. The social optimum occurs when engine i
deterministically displays page i, leading to a social welfare of
∑K
n=1 γ(n). By Theorem 4.2, the
unique pure equilibrium has each engine choosing each page n with probability γ(n). Each user
will then be satisfied with probability
∑N
n=1 γ(n)
2, regardless of his engine choice. The PoS is thus
∑K
n=1 γ(n)∑N
n=1 γ(n)
2
.
We now consider two special cases. First, when the first K pages have probability Θ(1/K)
each, and the remaining pages together have probability o(1/K), the PoS is Ω(K), as can be seen
by upper-bounding
∑N
n=1 γ(n)
2 ≤ ∑Kn=1 γ(n)2 + (∑n>K γ(n))2. Another distribution giving rise
to this type of behavior is when all pages have probability Θ(1/N).
Second, consider the following distribution: the top two pages have probability Θ(1/
√
N); the
remaining pages have probability Θ(1/N). The PoS becomes
Θ(1/
√
N)/Θ(1/N) = Θ(
√
N).
Thus, when there are a few highly relevant pages and many rare pages, the symmetric equilibrium
leads to high inefficiency Ω(
√
N).
5 When Satisfaction is Partially Beneficial: β ∈ (0, 1)
The previous two sections describe equilibria of two very different forms: an equilibrium with
deterministic and potentially non-symmetric page selections for the case β = 0, and a symmetric
equilibrium that follows the user type distribution for the case β = 1 under the proportional
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selection rule. We now consider the intermediate case, β ∈ (0, 1), which represents scenarios in
which search engines derive some, but not full, expected advertising benefit from a user who is not
served a desired page.
We show that, for any fixed β, our lower bounds on the PoS in Proposition 4.3 can persist as
long as the number of pages N is large. (However, for intermediate β values, we cannot rule out the
existence of other equilibria, so we obtain lower bounds on the PoA, not the PoS.) Our conclusion
is that the constant PoA bounds at β = 0 in general do not survive perturbations of β when the
selection rule is not convex.
5.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibria
Since our goal in this section — much like in Section 4.1 — is to establish strong lower bounds on
the Price of Anarchy, we again focus on the Singleton Search Engine Game with the proportional
selection rule f . We first show that the existence of symmetric equilibria for this class, established
for β = 1 in Section 4.1, continues to hold under small perturbations of β. The proof is conceptually
similar to that of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that β ∈ (0, 1). The Singleton Search Engine Game with proportional
selection rule f has at most one symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, whenever β > 1 − 1/K, a
symmetric equilibrium exists.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we can identify strategy profiles with satisfaction prob-
abilities Q, where qi(n) is the probability that engine i selects page n ∈ Ω. Suppose that Q is a
symmetric equilibrium, say with qi(n) = q(n) for all i and n. Then, as in the proof of Theorem 4.2,
q(n) > 0 for all n; otherwise, an engine could increase her utility by selecting page n with sufficiently
small probability. We can therefore assume that q(n) > 0 for all n.
Because each qi is a best response to the other engines’ strategies, it maximizes
ui(qi,q−i) =
∑
n
γ(n)f(q(n)) · (β + (1− β)qi(n))
=
∑
n
γ(n)
qi(n)∑
k qk(n)
· (β + (1− β)qi(n)),
subject to
∑
n qi(n) = 1. The Lagrangian for this constrained optimization is
Li(λi,qi) =
∑
n
γ(n)
qi(n)
qi(n) + (K − 1)q(n) · (β + (1− β)qi(n)) + λi(1−
∑
n
qi(n)).
Because qi(n) > 0 for all n, we can take derivatives; a necessary condition for qi to be a local
optimum for Li is then that
d
dqi(n)
Li(λi,qi) = 0 for each n. This yields
γ(n)
(K − 1)q(n) · (2(1 − β)qi(n) + β) + (1− β)qi(n)2
(qi(n) + (K − 1)q(n))2 = λi.
Because Q is symmetric, we also have that qi(n) = q(n) for all n, and can simplify this condition
to
γ(n)
(K − 1)β + (2K − 1)(1 − β)q(n)
K2q(n)
= λi.
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Writing λ′i =
K2λi
(K−1)β , z =
(2K−1)(1−β)
(K−1)β , and rearranging terms, we can solve for q(n) to get
q(n) =
γ(n)
λ′i − zγ(n)
. (10)
Because q(n) > 0, this implies λ′i > zγ(n) for all n. The condition
∑
n q(n) = 1 implies
∑
n
γ(n)
λ′i − zγ(n)
= 1. (11)
Now let n∗ ∈ argmaxn{γ(n)} be a page maximizing the probability of being desired. For λ in the
range (zγ(n∗),∞), we have γ(n)λ−zγ(n) > 0 for all pages n, and the expression
∑
n
γ(n)
λ−zγ(n) is strictly
decreasing, approaching 0 as λ → ∞ and approaching ∞ as λ → zγ(n∗). There is therefore a
unique solution (in λ′i) to the Equation (11) in the range (zγ(n
∗),∞). By choice of n∗, all terms of∑
n
γ(n)
λ′i−zγ(n) are positive at this solution, and each
γ(n)
λ′i−zγ(n) lies in (0, 1). Thus, the
γ(n)
λ′i−zγ(n) form a
valid distribution over pages, and constitute the only local maximum of the Laplacian. Thus, the
values q(n) = γ(n)λ′i−zγ(n) constitute the only candidate symmetric equilibrium.
10
It remains to show that this symmetric profile, which attains a local maximum for the utility
of each engine, is actually a global maximum (and thus a best response) for each player when
β > 1 − 1/K. To see this, note that d2ui(qi,q−i)dqi(n)dqi(n′) = 0 for all pairs of pages n 6= n′; furthermore, for
each page n,
d2ui(qi,q−i)
d2qi(n)
= −2γ(n)(
∑
k 6=i qk(n)) · (β − (1− β)
∑
k 6=i qk(n))
(
∑
k qk(n))
3
. (12)
Since
∑
k 6=i qk(n) ≤ K−1, our assumption that β > 1− 1K implies that β−(1−β)
∑
k 6=i qk(n)) > 0,
and hence d
2ui(qi,q−i)
d2qi(n)
< 0 over the entire domain of ui(·). This implies that the Hessian of ui(·) is
negative definite, and ui(·) is strictly concave. Thus, the local maximum described above is also a
global maximum. We conclude that the symmetric profile is an equilibrium.
5.2 Inefficiency of Equilibria
Having shown the existence of symmetric equilibria for sufficiently large β, we now show that for
specific instances, symmetric equilibria (and thus high PoA) arise for much smaller values of β
already. Specifically, we show that the bad examples from Proposition 4.3 persist for β = Ω(K/N)
and β = Ω(K/
√
N), respectively. Notice that since N ≫ K, this means that in realistic settings,
we cannot rule out high inefficiency due to search engine competition for any constant value of β.
We emphasize that while Proposition 4.3 provided lower bounds on the Price of Stability, we
have not ruled out the existence of asymmetric equilibria for β ∈ (0, 1); therefore, the propositions
in this section only prove lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy.
Proposition 5.2 Consider the Singleton Search Engine Game with proportional selection rule f .
If β > 2KN+2K , there are instances with PoA Ω(K).
10We remark that for β = 1, we get that z = 0, so we recover the analysis from the proof of Theorem 4.2 as a
special case.
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Proof. Let Γ be a nearly uniform distribution in general position; specifically, for each page n,
assume 1/N − 1/N2 ≤ γ(n) ≤ 1/N + 1/N2. We will reuse the calculations from the proof of
Theorem 5.1 to first find the symmetric strategies that form a local maximum of the Lagrangians
Li, then to verify that they constitute an equilibrium.
We begin by lower-bounding the value of λ′i from Equation (11). By the choice of γ(n), we have
N
1/N − 1/N2
λ′i − z(1/N − 1/N2)
≤
∑
n
γ(n)
λ′i − zγ(n)
= 1,
which can be solved for λ′i to conclude that
λ′i ≥ (N + z) · (1/N − 1/N2).
We next substitute this bound into Equation (10). Notice that γ(n)λ′i−zγ(n) is monotone decreasing
in λ′i and monotone increasing in γ(n). Therefore,
q(n) ≤ 1/N + 1/N
2
(N + z) · (1/N − 1/N2)− z(1/N + 1/N2) =
1/N + 1/N2
1− 1/N − 2z/N2 ≤
2
N
for sufficiently large N . (We used z = (2K−1)(1−β)(K−1)β ≤ 2N for β > 2KN+2K .) We have shown that the
unique symmetric local maximum is nearly uniform (up to lower-order terms).
To verify that the q(n) indeed constitute an equilibrium, we verify that the best-response
function for engine i is strictly concave, which implies that the local maximum is a global maximum.
It is enough to verify that the right-hand side of Equation (12) is negative, since this implies
negative definiteness of the Hessian. To see this, we observe that at the symmetric strategy profile,∑
k 6=i qk(n) ≤ 2(K−1)N , which implies that β−(1−β) ·
∑
k 6=i qk(n) ≥ 0, and thus that d
2ui(qi,q−i)
d2qi(n)
< 0.
Finally, having shown the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we infer that the PoA is Ω(K).
At equilibrium, a searcher can do no better than to pick an engine arbitrarily, yielding a welfare of∑
n γ(n) · q(n) ≤
∑
n γ(n) · 2/N = 2/N . On the other hand, in the optimum strategy, each engine i
would deterministically display page i (without loss of generality, assume that the pages are sorted
by decreasing γ(n)), yielding a searcher welfare of at least K/N .
Proposition 5.3 Consider the Singleton Search Engine Game with proportional selection rule f .
If β > 6√
N
, there are instances with K = 2 and PoA Ω(
√
N).
Proof. We use a distribution Γ in general position falling into the class used in the second part
of the proof of Proposition 4.3. The first two pages are requested frequently: 1/
√
N ≤ γ(1), γ(2) ≤
2/
√
N , while the remaining pages are requested roughly uniformly: 1/(N − 2) − 4/N1.5 ≤ γ(n) ≤
2/N . (It is easy to verify that these constraints admit distributions.) The outline of the proof is the
same as for Proposition 5.2: we use the characterization of λ′i and q(n) from the proof of Theorem 5.1
to lower-bound λ′i, then use this lower bound to upper-bound q(1) and q(2) by O(1/
√
N). Using
these bounds, we can verify that the symmetric local maximum of the Lagrangian is an equilibrium,
and bound the resulting PoA. The calculations are more involved due to the lack of symmetry across
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pages. First, from Equation (11), we get
1 =
∑
n
γ(n)
λ′i − zγ(n)
≥ 2/
√
N
λ′i − z/
√
N
+
1− 4(N − 2)/N1.5
λ′i − z · (1/(N − 2)− 4/N1.5)
≥ 2/
√
N
λ′i − z/
√
N
+
1− 4/√N
λ′i
.
Multiplying through and rearranging yields
(λ′i − 1)(λ′i − z/
√
N) ≥ 4z/N − 2λ′i/
√
N ≥ 2/
√
N · (z/
√
N − λ′i).
In the proof of Theorem 5.1, we argued that λ′i > zγ(n) for all n, so λ
′
i − z/
√
N > 0, and we can
divide by it to obtain that λ′i ≥ 1− 2/
√
N .
We next use this lower bound on λ′i, and the upper bound that γ(n) ≤ 2/
√
N , to upper-bound
the probability q(n) with which engines display pages. Substituting the bounds into Equation (10),
we obtain
q(n) ≤ 2/
√
N
1− 2/√N − z/√N =
2√
N − 2− z ≤
4√
N
,
because we assumed that β ≥ 6/√N ≥ 6/(2 +√N), which implies that z ≤ √N/2− 2.
To verify that the Hessian is negative definite, we show that the right-hand side of Equation (12)
is negative. Notice that
∑
k 6=i qk(n) ≤ 4/
√
N for all pages n, implying β− (1−β) ·∑k 6=i qk(n) ≥ 0,
because β ≥ 6/√N ≥ 4/(4 +√N). Thus, d2ui(qi,q−i)
d2qi(n)
< 0.
To bound the welfare at this equilibrium, note the probability that a user is satisfied is
∑
n
γ(n)q(n) ≤ 2 · 2/
√
N · 4/
√
N + 2/N
∑
n>2
q(n) = O(1/N).
On the other hand, the optimum solution would have engine i = 1, 2 deterministically display page
i, for a welfare of at least 2/
√
N . The PoA is thus Ω(
√
N).
6 Convexity of Markov Rules
We now describe a natural model of user behavior under which the selection rule is always convex.
By Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, if users behave according to this model, searcher welfare is high. The
model generalizes the Markov selection rule described in Section 2. Each search engine i corresponds
to a unique state. The user performs a walk on states, and always uses the engine corresponding
to his current state. The transition probabilities between states depend on whether the user was
satisfied in the previous round; we use τ
(s)
i,j and τ
(f)
i,j to denote the probability of moving from state i
to state j upon satisfaction or failure (non-satisfaction), respectively. The process has a stationary
distribution π, and the induced Markovian selection rule is fi(q) = πi.
Leaving state i after a successful (resp., failed) query induces a distribution over the state of
the process in the next round. In turn, that state defines an expected return time R
(s)
i (resp.,
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R
(f)
i ) to state i: the expected number of rounds before the process returns to state i. Note that
R
(s)
i , R
(f)
i ≥ 1.
We call a Markov process monotone if, for all i, τ
(s)
i,i ≥ τ (f)i,i and R(s)i ≤ R(f)i . The first condition
states that a user is no more likely to leave his current engine after a successful query than after a
failed query. The second condition says that, conditioning on having left engine i, the last query
having been successful should not increase the expected return time. The Markov process is strictly
monotone if the first inequality is strict. We show that monotone Markovian selection rules are
convex.
Theorem 6.1 Any (strictly) monotone Markovian selection rule is (strictly) convex.
Proof. For a given Markov process, consider the time spent in state i. Write p
(f)
i = 1 − τ (f)i,i
and p
(s)
i = 1− τ (s)i,i for the probability that the process leaves state i following a failure or success,
respectively. Given that the process is in state i, the expected number of rounds until the process
leaves state i is 1
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip(s)i
. Conditioned on having left state i, the probability that the last
search was successful is
qip
(s)
i
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip
(s)
i
, and the probability that it failed is
qip
(s)
i
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip
(s)
i
. We
conclude that the expected return time, conditioned on having left state i, is
qip
(s)
i
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip(s)i
R
(s)
i +
(1−qi)p(f)i
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip(s)i
R
(f)
i . Since the fraction of time spent in state i is the expected stay length divided
by expected stay length plus return time, we have that
πi =
1
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip(s)i
1
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip(s)i
+
qip
(s)
i
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip(s)i
R
(s)
i +
(1−qi)p(f)i
(1−qi)p(f)i +qip(s)i
R
(f)
i
=
1
1 + qip
(s)
i R
(s)
i + (1− qi)p(f)i R(f)i
.
We must show that πi is a valid selection rule, meaning that it is non-decreasing in qi. Taking the
derivative with respect to qi, we have
d
dqi
πi =
p
(f)
i R
(f)
i − p(s)i R(s)i
(1 + p
(f)
i R
(f)
i (1− qi) + p(s)i R(s)i qi)2
,
which is non-negative since p
(f)
i ≥ p(s)i and R(f)i ≥ R(s)i . Next, we show that πi is a convex function
of qi. Taking the second derivative with respect to qi, we have
d2
dq2i
πi =
2(p
(f)
i R
(f)
i − p(s)i R(s)i )2
(1 + p
(f)
i R
(f)
i (1− qi) + p(s)i R(s)i qi)3
,
which is non-negative, and strictly positive whenever p
(f)
i > p
(s)
i .
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
We introduced a natural model of competition between multiple search algorithms, who are vying
for visits from users searching for web pages. Our model interpolates between different objectives
for the search engines, and allows different user behavior models. At one extreme is the pay-per-
impression advertising, corresponding to an objective of attracting as many searchers as possible.
At the other extreme is pay-per-click advertising, corresponding to an objective of attracting and
satisfying as many searchers as possible.
Our main result is a strong dichotomy: when engines are directly incentivized to satisfy users,
we expect to see specialization, leading to a market that serves users well and achieves a (tight)
Price of Anarchy of 2. On the other hand, with pure pay-per-impression advertising, search engines
will generally play symmetrically, duplicating each other’s strategies. The Price of Stability in this
setting can be as bad as Ω(K) or Ω(
√
N). Furthermore, the bad equilibria often persist when
search engines interpolate between these extremes, even when the fraction of pay-per-impression
advertising is quite small. However, these pessimistic examples vanish under natural models of
user behavior in which the demand for an engine is a convex function of that engine’s search result
quality.
A number of questions remain open. Our lower bounds apply to the pure Price of Stability;
we did not rule out the existence of more benign mixed (or correlated) equilibria. Can the lower
bounds be generalized? Our understanding of equilibria for β ∈ (0, 1) is even more limited; how
can we characterize the equilibria in this case, and can we rule out asymmetric pure equilibria?
One could also consider approximate equilibria, in which engines cannot unilaterally deviate to
improve their payoffs much. It would be interesting to study the Price of Anarchy/Stability for
approximate equilibria.
Finally, another layer of complexity may be added to the model to be more realistic. Our model
posited that a user would choose an engine i for each search independently. In reality, most users
are loyal to one search engine, perhaps due to inertia. This could be modeled by assuming that
each user has a distribution over potential queries, and picks one engine to maximize the expected
probability of satisfaction across all queries. Analyzing the Price of Anarchy/Stability of this more
complex game is an interesting direction for future work.
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A Non-existence of Pure Equilibria
We justify the broadened focus on the correlated Price of Anarchy by showing here that even
the Singleton Search Engine Game with β = 0 may not have any pure Nash Equilibria. We
construct an instance with N = 2 pages and K = 3 engines. The page request probabilities are in
general position, with γ(n) ∈ (13 , 23 ) for n = 1, 2. The selection rule is as follows. For given q, define
γi = qi·2(qi+1−qi+2), with indices taken mod 3. The selection rule is then fi(q) = γi/(γ1+γ2+γ3). For
example, f1(1, 1, 0) = 4/5, whereas f1(1, 0, 1) = 1/5. Note that the fi satisfy the non-indifference
property.
By Theorem 3.1, if a pure equilibrium exists, it must be a profile of deterministic strategies.
There are two cases. First, if all three engines select the same page n, then the utility of each
engine is γ(n) · fi(1, 1, 1) = γ(n) · 13 < 2/9. In this case, each engine would benefit by switching to
the other page, which would give a utility of 13 > 2/9. Thus, this profile cannot be an equilibrium.
The second case is that two engines select one page, and the third engine selects the other. By
symmetry, we can assume that engines 1 and 2 select the same page n. In this case, the utility of
engine 2 is γ(n) · f2(1, 1, 0) = γ(n) · 15 ≤ 2/15. Note, then, that engine 2 would benefit by switching
to the other page n′; her utility would become γ(n′) · f2(0, 1, 1) = γ(n′) · 45 > 4/15. This profile is
therefore not an equilibrium, either. As we have exhausted all possibilities for a pure equilibrium,
we conclude that no pure equilibrium exists.
B Necessity of Assumptions in Theorem 3.1
At first sight, the assumptions of non-indifference of the fi and general position of Γ in Theorem
3.1 may appear like minor technical issues that should be easily eliminated. However, we provide
examples showing that the bound in Theorem 3.1 requires both assumptions, even for instances of
the Singleton Search Engine Game.
Example 1 (Necessity of Non-Indifference) Consider an instance of the Singleton Search En-
gine Game with N pages and K = N + 1 engines. Choose any distribution Γ in general position
over these singleton sets, subject to the constraint that γ(n) ∈ [ 23N , 43N ] for each page n.
Consider the following selection rule. First, engine N +1 is selected with probability fN+1(q) =
1 −∑i≤N fi(q), so it suffices to describe the selection rule on engines i ≤ N . For each i ≤ N , if
engine i is the only engine in [N ] with non-zero probability of displaying page n (i.e., qi > 0 and
qj = 0 for all j ∈ [N ]\{i}), then the user will always choose engine i, so fi(q) = 1. Otherwise, let
fi(q) = max(0,min(
1
N ,
1
2(1 −
∑
j∈[N ]\{i} qj))). In other words, engine i is selected with probability
1
2(1 −
∑
j∈[N ]\{i} qj))), but the value is “truncated” into the interval [0,
1
N ]. Note that the fi are
24
not non-indifferent, since fi(q) does not depend on qi(n) when qj(n) 6= 0 for any j ∈ [N ]\{i}. The
selection rules fi are, however, non-decreasing in qi(n) and non-increasing in qj(n) for j 6= i.
The socially optimal strategy profile is for each engine i ≤ N to deterministically display page
i. This profile leads to a welfare of 1.
We now describe an equilibrium profile. Let X =
(∑
j∈Ω
1
γ(j)
)−1
. Consider the symmetric
profile in which every engine selects page n with probability ρn =
γ(n)−X
γ(n)(N−1) . Note that since γ(n) ∈
[ 23N ,
4
3N ] for each n, we have
0 < ρn =
1− Xγ(n)
N − 1 ≤
1− 3N/43N2/2
N − 1 ≤
2
N
.
Moreover, the values (ρn) form a probability distribution (and hence a valid strategy profile) since
∑
n∈Ω
ρn =
1
N − 1 ·
∑
j
(
1− 1/γ(j)∑
n∈Ω 1/γ(n)
)
=
1
N − 1 ·
(
N −
∑
j∈Ω 1/γ(j)∑
n∈Ω 1/γ(n)
)
= 1.
Under this strategy profile, for engine i ∈ [N ] and page n, we have that
fi(q) = max
(
0,min
(
1
N
,
1
2
(1− (N − 1)ρn)
))
= min
(
1
N
,
X
2γ(n)
)
.
Because γ(n′) ∈ [ 23N , 43N ] for all pages n′, we get that γ(n) ≤ 2X/N , which in turn implies that
X
2γ(n) ≤ 1N , so fi(q) = X2γ(n) . The utility of engine i ≤ N under this strategy profile is therefore
∑
n
γ(n)fi(q(n)) · qi(n) =
∑
n∈Ω
X/2 · qi(n) = X/2,
which is independent of her strategy. Thus, every strategy is a best-response for engine i ≤ N ; in
particular, the proposed profile constitutes an equilibrium for the engines i ≤ N . Since the strategy
of engine N + 1 does not influence the payoff of the other engines, we may simply assume that
engine N + 1 plays some best response.
To bound the welfare of the equilibrium, we consider separately the engines i ≤ N and engine
N+1. Engine N+1 can satisfy a user with probability at most maxn{γ(n)} = O(1/N). For engines
i ≤ N , because their strategies are symmetric, the social welfare is precisely the probability that an
arbitrary engine satisfies a user type drawn from Γ. This is at most N ·maxn{ρn} ·maxn{γ(n)} =
O(1/N). The Price of Anarchy in this example is therefore Ω(N).
Example 2 (Necessity of General Position) Consider an instance of the Singleton Search En-
gine Game with K engines and N = K pages. The distribution over desired pages is uniform:
γ(n) = 1/N for each page n. The selection function is a weighted proportional rule: fi(q) =
wiqi∑
j wjqj
,
where w1 = K
2 and wj = 1 for all j 6= 1. (In other words, users have a significant preference for
engine 1.)
The socially optimal strategy profile is for each engine i to deterministically display page i in her
first slot; this leads to a social welfare of 1. Consider the following strategy profile: engine 1 selects
one of pages 1 through K − 1 uniformly at random to display in her first slot, and all remaining
engines deterministically display page K in their first slot with probability 1. We claim that this
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profile constitutes an equilibrium. To see why, note that engine 1 does not compete with any other
engine for pages 1 through K − 1. Thus, for any distribution p over pages 1 through K − 1 chosen
by engine 1 for slot 1, her utility is
∑
n<K
1
K p(n) =
1
K ; on the other hand, any weight placed on
page K is multiplied by a factor strictly less than 1 due to the competition, and thus leads to a loss
in utility. On the other hand, if any other engine chooses to display in her first slot a page n < K,
her utility conditioned on selecting that page is 1K · 11+K2 1
K−1
< 1
K2
, which is the utility derived from
page K. Thus, each engine i > 1 maximizes her payoff by displaying page K in her first slot with
probability 1. In summary, this strategy profile is an equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, a user who desires page K is satisfied with probability 1 (since he will
choose any of the engines that deterministically display it in the first slot), whereas any other user
is satisfied with probability 1K−1 (since he must choose engine 1, who displays the desired page with
this probability). The social welfare is thus 1K +
K−1
K · 1K−1 = 2K ; hence, the Price of Anarchy in
this example is Ω(K).
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